Whitelist mode now clears the parent env and re-adds a small allowlist
(identity, terminal, locale, proxy, non-GUI XDG, vendor prefixes).
Blacklist mode strips cloud credentials, backup passphrases, dangling
socket pointers, and anything matching *_TOKEN, *_SECRET, *_PASSWORD,
*_PASSPHRASE, *_API_KEY, *_PRIVATE_KEY, *_CLIENT_SECRET; vendor prefix
carve-outs keep ANTHROPIC_API_KEY and friends.
Users can override via --setenv KEY=VALUE and --unsetenv KEY (and the
corresponding TOML keys), or opt out of the built-in policy entirely
with --no-env-filter.
Derived from Podman's default profile, stripped of capability-conditional
rules (we never grant capabilities), argument filters, and the explicit
EPERM block. Dangerous syscalls (mount, unshare, ptrace, bpf,
perf_event_open, io_uring_*, keyctl, kexec_*, ...) fall through to the
default ENOSYS action, which also keeps glibc's clone3 -> clone fallback
working. x86_64 and aarch64 are supported; other archs error out.
Toggle with --seccomp / --no-seccomp or seccomp = <bool> in config.
Pair --hardened, --dry-run, and --unshare-net (renamed from --no-net)
with negation counterparts so a CLI invocation can override a truthy
config-file or profile value.
Canonicalizing rw/ro paths in the config layer resolved symlinks before
the sandbox was built, so a symlinked entry only appeared at its
target's location -- never at the path the user wrote. Stop
canonicalizing rw/ro at the config layer and instead resolve only the
source side of the bind in sandbox.rs.
Whitelist mode's implicit bwrap root was a writable tmpfs, letting the
sandboxed process create files and directories anywhere not covered by
an explicit ro mount. This was not an issue in blacklist mode due to
--ro-bind / / covering that case.
This patch adds --remount-ro / before any other mount to make the base
layer read-only in both modes.
mrtoth