Apply a seccomp-BPF syscall allowlist by default
Derived from Podman's default profile, stripped of capability-conditional rules (we never grant capabilities), argument filters, and the explicit EPERM block. Dangerous syscalls (mount, unshare, ptrace, bpf, perf_event_open, io_uring_*, keyctl, kexec_*, ...) fall through to the default ENOSYS action, which also keeps glibc's clone3 -> clone fallback working. x86_64 and aarch64 are supported; other archs error out. Toggle with --seccomp / --no-seccomp or seccomp = <bool> in config.
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@@ -16,6 +16,10 @@ The threat model is prompt injection and accidental damage, not a determined att
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**Not protected in blacklist mode:** arbitrary readable files outside the sensitive paths list, and D-Bus method calls (access control is daemon-side).
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## Seccomp
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Both modes apply a seccomp-BPF syscall allowlist derived from Podman's default profile. Dangerous syscalls (`mount`, `unshare`, `ptrace`, `bpf`, `perf_event_open`, `io_uring_*`, `keyctl`, `kexec_*`, …) return `ENOSYS`. Disable with `--no-seccomp` or `seccomp = false` in the config file.
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## Configuration file
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Settings can be stored in a TOML config file at `$XDG_CONFIG_HOME/agent-sandbox/config.toml` (or pass `--config <path>`). Use `--no-config` to skip loading it. The config file accepts the same options as the corresponding CLI flags.
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