Keep env values off the bwrap command line
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@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@ Both modes clamp the environment the child sees so prompt-injected agents can't
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Disable the built-in policy entirely with `--no-env-filter` (or `env-filter = false` in the config file) to pass the parent env through unchanged. User `--setenv`/`--unsetenv` escape hatches still apply.
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Env values never become `bwrap` arguments. The final environment is set on the `bwrap` process itself, so a secret passed via `env = ["KEY=VALUE"]` stays out of the world-readable `/proc/<pid>/cmdline`, out of `ps` output, and out of the exposed command line below.
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## Seccomp
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Both modes apply a seccomp-BPF syscall allowlist derived from Podman's default profile. Dangerous syscalls (`mount`, `unshare`, `ptrace`, `bpf`, `perf_event_open`, `io_uring_*`, `keyctl`, `kexec_*`, …) return `ENOSYS`. Disable with `--no-seccomp` or `seccomp = false` in the config file.
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